Browse Exhibits (41 total)

Canada often appears as little more than a footnote to studies of the shifting international order between world war and Cold War. As an emerging middle power, Canada neither played nor had any expectations of playing a central role in world affairs. With Britain in decline and the United States on the rise, Canada sought to reconcile its increasing autonomy with persistent hemispherical and ideological polarization. Nonetheless, Canada quietly crafted its own identity in international affairs, albeit always cognizant that the Canadian position would bear some relation to the policies of the United States and United Kingdom. 

Relative to the historiography of British or American foreign policy in this era, the history of Canada’s early Cold War foreign policy is limited. This, in turn, might appear to indicate a lack of relevance and worth. This is not quite right, or not totally right. Part of it can be explained by the methods by which Canada practised its diplomacy in this period: by thoughtful and analytic observation. The Canadian Embassy in Kuibyshev, and later Moscow, sought to inform the Department of External Affairs (DEA) of what was happening in the Soviet Union, but also how other states approached the USSR.

It is well known that Canada maintained close relations with both the United States and the United Kingdom and was influenced by their respective Soviet policies. What this narrative implies, however, is that Canadian diplomats in Moscow blindly followed the dominant opinions propounded by their larger allies. The documents in this collection show that this is not the case. The Canadian dispatches from 1943-46, chiefly written by Dana L. Wilgress, demonstrate a distinct shift in policy recommendations throughout the period. Though initially opposed to the hardline American approach, when it came time to choose, the Canadians could no longer support their “firm yet fair” policy and instead had to join the “tough school.”[1] Though they were willing members of the Western camp, the Canadians were swept along with the commanding American current of Soviet policy as the Cold War took on a more tangible form. 

Studies of Canadian early Cold War policy and foreign relations have generally neglected to answer how Canadian diplomats perceived US and British policies toward the Soviet Union, and how these in turn influenced Canadian interpretations and policy recommendations. The story of Canadian diplomatic circles in the early Cold War is rich and sheds light on Canada’s development as an international power in the 1940s. 

The documents in this collection have been selected to demonstrate the shift in Canadian diplomats’ Soviet policy recommendations from 1943-46. The Canadian Embassy to the Soviet Union was established in Kuibyshev in 1943, headed by Dana L. Wilgress, Ambassador to the Soviet Union. From 1940-42, Canada relied on British documents to be informed of Soviet policy, and so there was little Canadian analysis on location in the Soviet Union in this period.[2] The most compelling documents of the collection are written by Wilgress, whose perceptive analyses and recommendations illuminate the shifting Canadian position on Soviet policy from 1943-46. Wilgress’ opinions were highly regarded in Ottawa,[3] and further, the DEA was virtually the only ministry that was well-informed about foreign policy.[4] Mackenzie King was focused on domestic policy,[5] and hence the Canadian Foreign Service in the Soviet Union was virtually the Canadian government’s only direct contact with the Soviets.[6] Primary documents are invaluable for understanding how Canadian diplomats in the field understood the nature of the unfolding conflict in relation to Canada’s increasing autonomy, restructured Anglo-American relations, and shifting Anglo-American perceptions and Soviet policy from 1943-46.

Skule^TM Nite is a musical revue / comedy / sketch show run entirely by Engineering students at the University of Toronto. It is a professional-level production done entirely by volunteers, put on annually at Hart House (Skulepedia, https://skulepedia.ca/wiki/Skule_Nite). 

It has been one hundred years (give or take a few) since the first show and this exhibit is designed to let you meander through various aspects of the past and present. 

Welcome to Skule^TM Nite!

To learn more about Skule Nite 2T1 and other 100^th anniversary celebrations please visit www.uoft.me/skulenitecelebrate

Canada has long held an unusual position within NATO. At once strategically important due to its close proximity to the Arctic but also geographically isolated from Europe, historians and foreign policy experts continue to debate Canada’s role in NATO. Because Canada has neither the global reach of the United States nor the local considerations of European nations, some argue that Canada is uniquely positioned to be a mediating force within the North Atlantic Council.

Berlin was in many ways the powder keg of the Cold War and it seemed, during multiple crises after 1945, that the United States and the Soviet Union might go to war over their respective rights in the city. During the Second Berlin Crisis (1958–1962) the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, demanded that the United States, along with the British and French, pull all forces from the city, which they refused to do. At the same time, Khrushchev was offering to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and hand over responsibility for the border.

During the Second Berlin Crisis, the Western allies created contingency plans for the possibility of full-scale war. The contingency plans were made by two separate commands: the Tripartite (American-British-French) LIVE OAK and NATO itself, which later developed its own Berlin-contingency plans (BERCONs).

In 1959, the Americans, British, and French established the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in order to streamline the contingency-planning process and keep it contained amongst themselves. They also established an individual command called LIVE OAK that was separate from NATO. President John F. Kennedy’s administration wanted close coordination of planning between LIVE OAK and NATO. In September of 1961, General Lauris Norstad (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) briefed the North Atlantic Council on LIVE OAK and began an effort to develop NATO contingency plans that would build on LIVE OAK. What resulted was a months-long debate on the merits of the new NATO plans, with Canada’s ambassador Jules Léger expressing specific and significant concern about the inclusion of the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. He worried that the inclusion of nuclear weapons in any military plans would increase the likelihood of a full-scale nuclear exchange.

In 1962, the North Atlantic Council considered NATO’s own contingency plans.  While LIVE OAK plans were primarily defensive in nature, NATO’s BERCON was intended to “provide a demonstration of intent to go further.” Once again, the Canadian delegation, now led by Ambassador George Ignatieff, were the primary dissenters. The major issues continued to be political authority and nuclear weapons. Ignatieff stalled the planning for many months, but this had virtually no effect on the final plans. The Canadians were not viewed as a mediating force, but rather an “obstacle” to the Council, disrupting what was otherwise a consensus. Further, although they initially planned to make a reservation to the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the plans and thus take a controversial stance, Prime Minister Diefenbaker edited Ignatieff’s instructions at the last minute to include only an approval of the BERCON plans.

The compiled files offer an overview of this process from the Canadian perspective and allow us to examine and question Canada’s role within NATO. Did the Canadian delegation have an effect on American or NATO decision-making? Why might Canada feel more comfortable prolonging NATO decision-making than the European members?

"Discrimination on the basis of class, race, ethnic origin and sex," writes legal historian Constance Backhouse, has been "a hallmark of the Canadian legal response to prostitution." Long before the Canadian government's passage of Bill C-36 in 2014, numerous laws have attempted to end "the world's oldest profession" in Canada. Beyond stopping the exchange of money for sex, however, these laws have also frequently been used to police a range of communities based on hierarchies of race, class, gender and sexuality.

Moral reformer (right) harassing a sex worker (left) in a red light district

This digital exhibit complements and expands upon the exhibition, Canada's Oldest Profession: Sex Work and Bawdy House Legislation, on display in Robarts Library, 1st floor exhibition space, from March 8th to June 1st, 2016. It includes material featured in the exhibit and additional information related to the topic of the history of sex work and bawdy house legislation in Canada. The exhibit is sponsored by the University of Toronto Libraries, the Departments of History, and Sexual Diversity Studies. 

The University of Toronto Music Library's Canadian Sheet Music Collection highlights the Toronto music publishers’ responses to the Great War. The sheet music included in this exhibit comes straight from our archival vault and was published between 1914 and 1918.

The incredible cover art and inset photos of military personnel aside, the intense and frequently heartfelt lyric of these pieces speak to the ways in which everyday people on the home front responded to the war, whether through wholehearted support, or recognition of longing, loss and death. The outpouring of human emotion imbued in these texts provides a direct window into the mindset of people from 100 years ago, when considerable anxiety gripped the public at large as everyday people struggled with the personal costs brought about through the wholescale devastation and slaughter.